war

“THE CAUSES FOR WAR”

“What is the objective of war?” asks Cāṇakya.

“To acquire more power,” Pabbata answers.

“And what such powers are acquired by war?” asks Cāṇakya.

“The power to tax,” suggests Pabbata.

“To improve the conquered country by enforcing security, eradicating wild tribes and such,” suggests Daṇḍaśarman.

“Or by creating academies and granting uncultivated lands to Brāhmaṇas for cultivation,” suggests Pāṇini.

“Or by improving the judicial system and outlawing wicked practices in the conquered country,” suggests Candragupta.

A conqueror may possess many goals, including taxation, enactment of better laws in the conquered land, protection or formation of trade networks, or control over locations of strategic importance such as to protect one’s country from invasion or to clear a path for one’s army to conquer the country beyond the conquered country. For all these goals, the conqueror requires the loyalties of men in the enemy’s country; thus in general terms the goal of the conqueror is to be able to govern the conquered country.

Sometimes this loyalty amounts to accepting the conquered king as a vassal, or in some cases even deposing him entirely, and governing the conquered country as a province of one’s own. But sometimes all that is desired is a trade treaty, or the protection of trade routes, or the installation of a ruler more friendly to the conqueror’s interests.

Much as one starts with the definition of the elements to explain the laws of science, one must start from the definition of war to explain the tactics of war. The term war invokes images of battles and expeditions, but the definition is far more general. For example, it also includes a coup or a civil war, or a war fought through deception alone.

The efforts taken to acquire some article in the sense of exercising right over it – a country, a route, a fort, port or strategic position, a water source, some loot, slaves, a woman or several, honour and glory – is termed war.

Some of these causes are just; others are not.

Those that impede such efforts are termed enemies.

“I have heard the term Cakravarti used to refer to an emperor who rules all of the civilized world,” says Candragupta, “Is that a just cause for war as well?”

Cāṇakya declines to answer that question.

I shall now discuss the means of waging war.

“Suppose that I wished to acquire the country of Avanti for the right to tax it,” says Cāṇakya, “At the very least, I would need to send a messenger to their tax collectors to send their taxes to me instead of to their king. What would happen then?”

“You’d be laughed at,” says Pabbata.

“Indeed, for they have no reason to comply. Suppose that I threatened to execute them if they didn’t comply, or if I offered them a salary to comply. What would happen then?”

“You’d still be laughed at, if you are known to have no means of following up on your word. But if you do follow up on your word, the king of Ujjain would capture and punish you for your crime.”

“Or at least, they will punish whichever agents I send to carry out these activities. So the king of Ujjain is doing something I do not wish him to do. What do I do when I wish to change someone’s behaviour to my liking?”

“The doctrine of sāma-dāma-daṇḍa-bheda (persuasion, purchase, punishment, deceit),” Śrībhānu recalled. “You will employ these means to cause the king of Ujjain to do your bidding.”

Pabbata smirks. “Good luck with that. The king of Ujjain is a viceroy of Magadha.”

“These discussions are theoretical,” says Cāṇakya sternly. “Can you tell me which of these four methods I will use, and how?”

“You could hardly persuade the king or the tax collectors to pay you taxes,” says Pāṇini, “Bribing someone to give you money hardly sounds sensible. I suppose you could deceive them by bribing some cart drivers and border guards—”

“Recall that I am not merely attempting a one-time plunder,” says Cāṇakya, “I wish to have the right to tax the land, as recognized by its people, so that I can do so unopposed and peacefully.”

“You would punish the king of Ujjain,” said Daṇḍaśarman. “Or threaten him with punishment.”

One method of such punishment is assassination. Indeed, this is what has been constantly occurring in Magadha as we speak. Yet, the king may be too well-guarded to easily assassinate, or the king’s ministers may have decision-making power, and they may not care so much about the health of the king as they do of the health of the country. Or I may be worried of the king attempting a counter-assassination on myself, and for a king endowed with wealth, that may have a greater chance of success.

Thus I wish to harass the country of Avanti in order to have them do my bidding.

What is the best way to harass a country?

There are two forms of harassment: generic harassment, with the understanding that it will stop if they submit to my will, or targeted harassment, that specifically punishes the action that I wish to forbid. The latter is preferable if I only wish to conquer a portion of their country, or if I wish to force them into accepting a treaty on trade and such; the former is preferable if I wish to conquer their entire country.

Generic harassment takes many forms: assassinations and kidnappings of important officials, robbing treasuries, capturing territories other than the desired one as hostage, destructive acts such as burning countries, plundering cities and poisoning water sources, blocking of trade routes and food supplies.

Targeted harassment involves battles. Battle may emerge between the army I send to rob their treasuries and the army they send in defence of it, and then such battles may escalate as each side sends reinforcements. Such battles are to be avoided, as they are unplanned – instead, the conqueror must plan in advance and send an army of the size and composition that will eventually be needed. Secretive methods may also be employed to aid a battle.

When the costs the conqueror imposes through these methods exceeds the costs of surrender for the defender, the conqueror wins.

An expedition should only be undertaken if its expected profit – from gathered taxes and loot, concern for the welfare of the conquered people, precautionary cause, strategic cause – exceeds its costs.

Thus, a war whose outcome is known in advance to both sides should never be fought.

Thus, all warfare is deception.

To harass a country – plunder its cities, burn its fields, capture its leaders, and so on – one needs to place an army in the midst of that country. Routes are too easily blocked, and mobilizing armies is costly and time-consuming, thus the necessity to establish or capture forts. Similarly, a defender needs forts to mobilize one’s army more easily, and to be able to pinch direct attacks in the centre of the country. For one large lion can be fought, but it is much harder to fight a pack of wolves that surrounds you on all sides.

A defender may judge that instead of retreating to a fort, he may defeat the attacker’s army in battle before it reaches the fort. This may be advised if the defender can find a location for battle that favours him, such as a river crossing or certain terrain, as these act as forts of their own sorts. But forts are preferred, as they can be designed by men to function as desired, much as agriculture is desired to hunting and gathering fruits in the forest. Thus the conqueror should also establish military camps.

“I will pose to you a question,” says Cāṇakya, “Why don’t conquerors simply focus on capturing the capital through an assassination, rather than make extensive efforts to capture bordering cities and forts?”

“Kings tend to be well-guarded?” Daṇḍaśarman suggests.

“Pabbata,” asks Cāṇakya, “What would happen if I were to assassinate Dhanānanda?”

“You would quickly be executed by Sakadala, and Augraseniya would be appointed Emperor,” Pabbata answers.

“What if, instead of assassinating Dhanānanda, I entered Magadha territory and somehow raised a local army and laid siege to Pāṭaliputra?”

“Then the surrounding forts loyal to the emperor would surround and destroy your army.”

“Those are similar outcomes,” Apratimaujas observes, “If you attack the emperor, his allies within the palace will destroy you; if you attack the palace, the armies of the city will attack you; if you attack the city, the armies of the country will attack you; if you attack the country, the armies of the vassals will attack you; and if you attack the empire, the armies of the allies will attack you.”

“So one must know where to attack from,” Candragupta considers, “Weighing the quickness of a direct attack against the unopposed nature of an attack from the outside?”

“Not exactly,” says Cāṇakya, “An attack from the inside must also fight all those who attempt to stop him, as must an attack from the outside. However, an attack from the inside may cause the conqueror to be more easily surrounded, and thus poses a strategic disadvantage in terms of positioning. Can anyone state the more general point I am trying to demonstrate?”

“That the conqueror’s victory depends on acquiring the loyalties of each of the defender’s elements of sovereignty,” says Apratimaujas, “The allies’ loyalties depend on their belief as to who will emerge victorious; yet your victory depends on the allies’ loyalties.”

“It is akin to the problem of teaching Scythians the Civilized Tongue,” says Candragupta.

“It is akin to a self-fulfilling prophecy,” says Pāṇini.

Indeed, the art of war is the art of commanding the loyalties of the elements of sovereignty. There are many methods to do acquire the loyalties of the enemy’s elements.

If the conqueror already possesses a greater degree of sovereignty than the defender – such as through a sufficiently larger army, wealthier treasury, larger or superior country, or a king and minister that govern with greater intellect – then that alone is sufficient to acquire the elements, as the enemy is aware that an attempt to oppose the conqueror can be punished effectively by the conqueror.

If the conqueror is starting with little, then he must employ many cunning methods to acquire these elements. For example, he may pretend to have acquired an ally to acquire another ally, and vice versa to acquire the first ally. Or he may sow dissension within the enemy’s country to weaken the enemy’s command over his own elements, thus allowing even a weak king to conquer the country. Or he may take the support of a new ally entirely.

Such methods are diverse and require creativity, they cannot simply be taught through lecture. I will eventually, through the means of various games, teach you to independently suggest such methods when necessary.

A particular method to create self-fulfilling prophecies is the manipulation of the enemy’s morale. This is the purpose of motivating an army through speeches, of demoralizing the enemy’s army, of slaying commanders, of planting flags on fortresses, of writing declarations of war and independence, of fabricating bad omens, of creating false genealogies and prophecies, of seeking verbal endorsement from distinguished Brāhmaṇas, and of performing the _Aśvamedha ritual.

No individual soldier needs to be motivated by the speech, yet the collective of all soldiers is motivated by it, as each individual soldier will think, “As this king has given this speech, all my compatriots will be more loyal to him, and thus he has a greater chance of succeeding, and when he does succeed, I shall be rewarded if I am loyal to him now”, and all his compatriots think the same. Similarly, no enemy soldier needs to be superstitious for a bad omen to demoralize him, for he need only think “All my compatriots will be demoralized by this bad omen, thus the enemy will win, thus I will benefit from betraying my king”, and all his compatriots think the same.

This is also why houses are built in accordance with the principles of Vāstu, for each man thinks “If I purchase a house not in accordance with such principles, no one will buy it from me”, and even if no one man believes in these principles, men will believe in it as a collective.

I will make some comments on how such methods may be executed successfully.

The pronouncement of inspiring speeches can be compared to flirtations between a man and an unchaste woman. Each soldier is afraid to immediately proclaim his loyalty by crying “Victory to the Great King!”, as his compatriots may not share this feeling, and indeed they will not, as each of them thinks the same. Instead, he may express interest in the king’s words, put on an expression of high morale, breath and stand in an inspired manner, and applaud the king with a cry or through gestures, in that order, all as he observes similar signals from his compatriots. The process may also be aided by taking in confidence beforehand particular soldiers of decent repute to cry “Victory to the Great King!” in order to pressure their compatriots to do the same.

The key to turning loyalties is to make oneself distinguished in some way; it does not matter which way. For example, a relative of the king, the minister or general, a subjugated house or vassal state, an imprisoned or exiled king of an extinguished line all have a greater chance of conquering a country than does an ordinary man. People are also more likely to follow men distinguished by their wealth, scholarship, high birth and fame. That is why when a prince of a king may even conquer the capital directly, while an external king would likely fail in this mission unless he appoints a local governor as his vassal.

One way to avoid betrayal, whether intentional or by such tactics, is to associate with allies of good repute, such as ancient noble lines that will defend the honour of their word with their lives, or with mercenary clans of good repute, or with close and reliable friends with character that can be personally appraised.

Similarly to prevent attacks on his own army’s morale, a king must train his soldiers and other government servants to a protocol. This is known as “discipline”.

When attacking a disciplined army, a conqueror must expose them to unexpected situations that they have not been trained a protocol for.

Thus each possible situation must be anticipated and effective protocols must be developed to be followed in these situations.

To develop the best counter-play to the enemy, a king must also gather information about the enemy, such as of the size and composition of his army, and the tactics he may employ. This is ascertained with scouts and spies. For example, the composition of one’s army must reflect what is needed to oppose the other’s army, such as the use of archers against infantry, and the use of cavalry against archers; as must the fortifications and location of battle.

If both parties had complete knowledge of the other’s army and sent the best army to oppose it, the result would be heavy bloodshed on both sides.

Thus all warfare is deception.

Discipline also has its disadvantages, as following orders may lead men off a cliff. Thus, per the needs of the situation, a king may employ mercenaries, or entertain his own soldiers as mercenaries by placing bounties on the achievement of certain goals, such as slaying a commander. Bounties on the achievement of greater goals, like seizing a fortress, may be offered to organized mercenary clans rather than to individual soldiers.

For completeness, I shall discuss the method of Dharmayuddha.

It is observed among some wild beasts that when they fight among themselves, they fight with their paws sheathed. Even though unsheathing their paws would allow them a greater chance to succeed, doing so will also prompt their enemy to unsheathe their paws, causing a great deal of destruction to both sides. Thus the beasts silently agree on certain rules of what is foul and what is not.

Similar observations can be made about pitched duels between princes.

Similar observations can be made about debates between scholarly Brāhmaṇas.

Similarly, two enemies may agree beforehand to fight on a particular battlefield at a specified time, to only bring certain weapons or an army of certain size to the fight, to obey certain rules during the battle, to surrender a predefined objective upon defeat in this battle, to not depose the defeated king but to reinstate him as ruler subject to certain acceptable conditions, and so on. Such rules are followed by clans in the interest of preserving their reputation.

As it is only kṣatriya warriors who may be expected to uphold such rules, armies of vast numbers cannot be raised by employing peasant soldiers in such battles. Thus such battles cannot be fought against tribes such as the Scythians that conscript entire populations into their armies. Nor can such rules be followed while fighting against Western tribes whose army compositions are vastly different from those of civilized states, or against tribes that have no reputation to uphold, or against tribes of poor reputation.

Following rules that your enemy doesn’t follow is suicide with extra steps.

Thus Kutayuddha is of great importance when fighting against barbarians.

As an exercise, you shall explain why states are nearly always contiguous, and what this entails for our assumptions about statecraft.